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ABSTRACT
The problem of anomaly detection has been studied for a
long time, and many Network Analysis techniques have been
proposed as solutions. Although some results appear to be
quite promising, no method is clearly to be superior to the
rest. In this paper, we particularly consider anomaly de-
tection in the Bitcoin transaction network. Our goal is to
detect which users and transactions are the most suspicious;
in this case, anomalous behavior is a proxy for suspicious
behavior. To this end, we use the laws of power degree &
densification and local outlier factor (LOF) method (which
is proceeded by k-means clustering method) on two graphs
generated by the Bitcoin transaction network: one graph
has users as nodes, and the other has transactions as nodes.
We remark that the methods used here can be applied to
any type of setting with an inherent graph structure, includ-
ing, but not limited to, computer networks, telecommunica-
tions networks, auction networks, security networks, social
networks, Web networks, or any financial networks. We use
the Bitcoin transaction network in this paper due to the
availability, size, and attractiveness of the data set.
Keywords
Anomaly detection, Bitcoin, k-means, LOF.
1. INTRODUCTION
Network structures have appeared for a long time, and
along with them are those who behave abnormally within
the system. We refer to these people or their illegal activ-
ities as anomalies. With respect to financial transactional
networks, anomalies can include those who execute fraud-
ulent transactions. In these networks, a common goal is
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to detect those anomalies to prevent future illegal actions.
People really care about detecting the anomalies due to in-
creasing theft rates, both specifically in the Bitcoin network
and in other financial networks.
Bitcoin is a special type of transaction system; more infor-
mation about it can be found in http://bitcoin.org/en/.
We seek to use anomaly detection as a proxy for suspicious
users/activities detection. Similarly, anomaly detection is
used to detect fradulent purchases in credit card systems or
network congestion in computer networks. However, in this
anonymous network, nodes (i.e. users, transactions) are un-
labeled and there is no confirmation as to whether or not a
given node is actually conducting illicit activities.
In this project, we focus particularly on the problem of de-
tecting anomalies in the Bitcoin transaction network, which
is certainly related to the study of fraud detection in all types
of financial transaction systems in which a rich literature is
available (Pham and Lee [5], Farren et al. [2]). Since this
problem can be generalized to those in other network set-
tings, which may or may not involve financial transactions,
we are examining the more general problem of anomaly de-
tection in networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 presents related work. Section 3 describes our methods,
including data collection and parsing, feature extraction,
and mathematical descriptions of the network analysis tech-
niques. Section 4 discusses evaluation methods. Section 5
presents the results we obtain by running these techniques
on the network-type data set we generated. Section 6 eval-
uates our methods and results. Section 7 mentions future
works. Section 8 concludes our study.
2. RELATED WORK
There are many research studies that concern anomaly
detection, and these studies use a variety of techniques in-
cluding machine learning and network analysis techniques.
For the purpose of this paper, we will review related network
analysis results only.
Leskovec et al. [3] describe the properties of graph evo-
lution over time, which are different from what many pre-
vious papers would predict. One key idea is the densifi-
cation power law which states that in log - log scale, most
graphs densify with the number of edges being a linear func-
tion of the number of nodes. Leskovec et al. then discuss
Forest Fire Model, which reproduces many key properties
of real networks including densification power law, heavy
tailed in/out - degrees, etc. The comment given out is that
the graphs are abnormal if these laws and characteristics fail
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to satisfy. This is the motivation for our first analysis that
uses densification power law and power law degree distribu-
tion on the Bitcoin network. We will also use the power law
degree distribution for other features other than in-degree
and out-degree. If we detect any structures induced by
users’ activities that deviate significantly from these laws,
we may conclude that there is something abnormal in the
network. We will use this as the preliminary anomaly de-
tection method to see if anomalous structures actually exist
in the network.
Smith et al. [6] make use of clustering techniques to detect
anomalies. The main idea is that these methods should be
able to group normal users/activities together and separate
from abnormal ones. Smith et al. use k-means clustering,
self-organizing maps, and the expected maximization algo-
rithm to develop methods for the detection process. Moti-
vated by this, we think we can have a good use of k-means
clustering method on the Bitcoin dataset. However, we will
not use k-means as a real method to detect anomalies be-
cause clustering in its deep sense is for grouping purposes.
Instead, we will use it as a baseline model. Since we expect
outliers (i.e. anomalies) to stay far away from the centroids
found by k-means, k-means can be used to assess our true
method. In the same sense, k-means is helpful for visualiza-
tion purposes. Most importantly, without k-means to find
the centroids, we cannot calculate LOF indices in the next
part, which defines our notion of anomalies; the connection
between k-means clustering method and LOF method will
be discussed in more details in the Methods section.
Breunig et al. [1] propose the Local Outlier Factor (LOF)
method to detect outliers in a dataset. This method relies
on the concept of local density, with locality defined by k
nearest neighbors and density estimated by distances. Ba-
sically, they compare the local density of a point (a node)
to that of its neighbors to identify regions of similar den-
sity and points that have substantially higher densities than
their neighbors; these points are then labeled as outliers.
We find this method suitable for our study because not only
outliers can be understood as anomalies, but also we do not
need labelled data to feed in the calculations. Thus, we will
use this method as our main methodology to detect anoma-
lies in the Bitcoin network. We then use k-means clustering
results discussed above to verify our findings.
3. METHODS
In this section, we will first data collection and parsing.
Then, we describe feature extraction, and finally we provide
mathematical explanations for the social network analysis
techniques we will use.
3.1 Data Collection and Parsing
We use the Bitcoin transaction data set obtained from
Stanford Network Analysis Project. All Bitcoin transactions
are documented in a public ledger and are in the currency
unit called the Bitcoin (BTC). The data set contains all
Bitcoin transactions beginning from the network’s creation
until April 7th, 2013. For each transaction, there can be
multiple sender and receiver addresses. Furthermore, mul-
tiple addresses can belong to a single user. Finally, users
are also anonymous in that there are no names or personal
information associated with a given user.
The data set is quite large: there are 6, 336, 769 users with
37, 450, 461 transactions. We parse the data in two ways.
The first way, which we will call the user graph, is quite
intuitive: users (where each user owns a list of addresses)
are nodes and transactions between users are edges. The
second way, which we will call the transaction graph, models
transactions as nodes and Bitcoin flow between transactions
as edges.
In our analysis, we will use both graph types to investi-
gate the Bitcoin network. The user graph will help us detect
suspicious users, while the transaction graph will help us
detect suspicious transactions. Using these two graph rep-
resentations, we can not only find out both abnormal users
and abnormal activities, but also check if our methods are
consistent in the sense that suspicious transactions should
belong to suspicious users.
3.2 Feature Extraction
In order to use k-means as a baseline and calculate the
local outlier factor (LOF), for each node in the graph we ex-
tract a set of features. Note that for the two afore-mentioned
network representations of the data, the set of features are
not the same; even if they share the same feature names,
those names may mean very different things.
3.2.1 User Graph
For the user graph, we choose the set of features from the
followings:
• In-degree: Number of transactions received by a given
user.
• Out-degree: Number of transactions sent by a given
user.
• Unique in-degree: Number of unique users a given user
has received transactions from.
• Unique out-degree: Number of unique users a given
user has sent transactions to.
• Average in-transaction: Average number of bitcoins
received per incoming transaction.
• Average out-transaction: Average number of bitcoins
sent per outgoing transaction.
• Average time interval between in-transactions.
• Average time interval between out-transactions.
• Number of public keys owned by a given user.
• Balance: Net number of bitcoins retained by user.
• Clustering coefficient: measure of connectivity amongst
neighbors of a given user.
• Creation date: timestamp of first transaction associ-
ated with a given user.
• Active duration: time difference between first and most
recent transactions associated with a given user.
• . . .
3.2.2 Transaction Graph
For the transaction graph, we choose the set of features
from the followings:
• In-degree: Number of transactions (i.e. nodes) that
tak money from a given transaction (i.e. a given node).
• Out-degree: Number of transactions that a given trans-
action takes money from.
• Unique in-degree: Number of unique transactions that
take money from a given transaction.
• Unique out-degree: Number of unique transactions that
a given transaction takes money from.
• Average in-transaction: Average number of bitcoins
on each incoming edge to a given transaction.
• Average out-transaction: Average number of bitcoins
on each outgoing edge from a given transaction.
• Average time interval between in-transactions.
• Average time interval between out-transactions.
• Number of users a given transaction is associated with.
• Balance: Net number of bitcoins for a given transac-
tion considering all in- and out-going edges from that
transaction.
• Clustering coefficient: measure of connectivity amongst
neighbors of a given transaction.
• Creation date: timestamp of first edge associated with
a given transaction.
• Active duration: time difference between first and most
recent edges associated with a given transaction.
• . . .
3.3 Network Analysis Techniques
We will use three methods to discover and detect anoma-
lies in the bitcoin network. These methods should be also
suited for anomaly detection in any network setting systems.
3.3.1 Power Degree & Densification Laws
Generally, the densification power law states that
E(t) ∝ N(t)α,
where N(t) and E(t) are numbers of nodes and edges at time
t, and α is some positive constant. The power law degree
states that in many real world network,
P (k) ∝ k−γ ,
where P (k) is the fraction of nodes that have degree k and
γ is some positive constant. Hence in a normal network,
log(P (k)) is a linear function of log(k). We expect this re-
lation to hold when nodes’ degrees are replaced by their
in-degrees, their out-degrees, and in the bitcoin system that
we consider, their balances, average transaction sizes, and
total amounts of transactions as well.
3.3.2 k-means Clustering
The purpose of the k-means clustering method is to par-
tition m points (i.e. m nodes in the graph) into k groups
of similar characteristics. The optimal choice of k for the
Bitcoin data will be determined in the Results section.
For this method to work, we first need to represent each
node as a multi-dimensional vector in the Euclidean space;
each dimension of a node is a feature that we choose from
the list described in part 2.2. For runtime purposes, we did
not use the entire list of features per node; instead we select
a subset of features for each node. For the user-as-node
graph, we use the following six features.
• In-degree
• Out-degree
• Mean incoming transaction value
• Mean outgoing transaction value
• Mean time interval
• Clustering coefficient
For the transaction-as-node network, we use three fea-
tures:
• In-degree
• Out-degree
• Total value of the transaction
This procedure produces a set of m points (i.e. nodes)
(x1, ..., xm) for which xi ∈ Rn for each i = 1, ...,m. Here
n = 6 or 3. We seek to partition these m points into k
clusters S = (S1, ..., Sk) to solve
min
S
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈Si
||x− µi||2,
where µi is the mean of the points in Si for each i = 1, ..., k.
We use the k-means clustering algorithm as a heuristic method
to solve this problem. The algorithm in details can be found
in Lloyd [4].
Our final note in this part is that to account for the power
law nature of the feature values, we use the normalized log
of feature values.
3.3.3 Local Outlier Factor
We denote by d(A,B) the distance between two points
A and B. Furthermore, we denote by k-distance(A) the
distance of the point A to its k-th nearest neighbor. We
also define the set of k-th nearest neighbors of a point A:
Nk(A) = {B | d(A,B) = k-distance(A)}.
Then, we define reachability distance:
reachability-distancek(A,B) = max{k-distance(B), d(A,B)}.
In other words, the reachability distance indexed k of a
point A from a point B is the true distance between the
two points, but this distance must be at least the k-distance
of B. Note that the reachability distance is not symmetric.
Then, we can define the most important definition in this
part, the local reachability density of a point A, to be
LRD(A) :=
(∑
B∈Nk(A) reachability-distancek(A,B)
|Nk(A)|
)−1
.
Intuitively, it is the inverse of the average reachability dis-
tance of the point A from its neighbors. Then, we use these
quantities to calculate LOFk(A), which is defined by the av-
erage local reachability density of A’s neighbors divided by
the A’s own local reachability density, i.e.
LOFk(A) =
∑
B∈Nk(A) LRD(B)
|Nk(A)| \LRD(A).
So if LOFk(A) ≈ 1 for some point A, then we imply that
A is comparable to its neighbors and therefore A is not an
outlier; if LOFk(A) << 1, then we imply a denser region and
we conclude that A might be an inlier; and if LOFk(A) >>
1, we indicate A as an outlier.
A final remark in this part is about what we meant earlier
about using k-means clustering to calculate the LOF indices.
Technically, we do not need the results obtained by k-means
clustering to determine the LOF indices; instead, we need
k-nearest-neighbors. When implementing the LOF method,
however, we use k-means clustering results to narrow down
the list of potential k-nearest-neighbors for a given node.
Basically, using k-means, once we obtain the list of nodes
for each cluster, we can (somewhat reasonably) search for
a given node’s k-nearest-neighbors within the cluster it is
grouped in - this saves computational time by a factor of
∼ 49 for computing the LOF indices.
4. EVALUATION METHODS
With unlabeled data, evaluating our methods is a major
challenge. Due to the nature of the network-type data set
we have, we propose three evaluation methods.
• Using k-means as a baseline, we can calculate the rel-
ative distances between the detected outliers with the
centroids. If these values are small, then we conclude
that our (LOF) method might not be a good method
of anomaly detection. We call this“Visualization Eval-
uation.”
• Since we represent our data in two ways with nodes and
edges somehow exchanging, we can test if our methods
are consistent by checking if detected suspicious users
match with detected suspicious transactions. We call
this “Dual Evaluation.”
Specifically, with the user-as-node representation we
can get the topN user outliers and with the transaction-
as-node representation we can get the top M transac-
tion outliers. In this paper, we choose N = M = 100.
We then determine XN - the set of transactions cor-
responding to the top N node outliers and YM - the
set of users corresponding to the top M transaction
outliers defined above. We define
A1 =
|XN ∩ top XN transaction outliers|
|XN |
and
A2 =
|YM ∩ top YM user outliers|
|YM | .
Finally, we define the Dual Evaluation Metric mDE by
mDE =
A1 +A2
2
.
Note that mDE ∈ [0, 1], and the bigger it is the more
accurate our method is.
• Finally, there are around 30 revealed thieves in the
Bitcoin network. We can check if they belong to our
detected suspicious user and transaction sets.
5. RESULTS
We apply our network analysis techniques for both the
network representations of the data. We implement these
methods using the full dataset.
5.1 Power Degree & Densification Laws
We first look at the densification power law for the two
graph types. (See Figures 1− 2.)
Figure 1: The log-log Plot of Edge Number over
Node Number - User Graph.
Figure 2: The log-log Plot of Edge Number over
Node Number - Transaction Graph.
The densification power law does not seem to be so well
satisfied for the user-as-node graph, but perfectly satisfied
for the transaction-as-node graph type.
A straight line for the transaction graph indicates that
the number of edges (i.e. the number of transactions con-
necting with one another) is a reliable exponential function
of the number of nodes (i.e. the number of transactions in
the network) over time. This says, either there is nothing
wrong with the network or people just try to hide the abnor-
mal activities through seemingly legitimate transactions. If
thieves are available, they will certainly put in every effort
to make their transactions look licit in this easiest sense - the
number of money flows among transactions is exponentially
proportional to the number of transactions. Otherwise, they
can easily be detected.
The corresponding plot for the user graph is different. In
this plot, although the plot has the shape of a straight line, it
bends in the middle and at the end of the line. This might
indicate that some users enter the network and make an
unusual number of transactions; in other words, thieves are
well available. To explain for the first two plots, we observe
that thefts in fact occur in the network; and while thieves
can control for the legitimate appearance of the number of
money flows among transactions, they cannot control for the
number of transactions they make; when both of these are
normal, they cannot win free money.
Now, we investigate the power law degree distribution for
various measures including in-degree, out-degree, balance,
and average transaction size for the user-as-node graph type
and in-degree, out-degree, total amount of transaction for
the transaction-as-node graph. (See Figures 3− 4.)
Figure 3: The log-log Plot of Degree / Balance /
Transaction Size Distributions - User Graph.
First, we observe the user graph. (Figure 3.) The log-log
plot of the in-degree distribution fits quite well the power
degree law as there seems to be a straight line going through
the points on the plot. So there would not be any problem
with this distribution. Now we turn to the log-log plot of the
out-degree distribution. The linear relation starts to appear
broken as many points are unusually out of the core. As we
have explained above, since thieves cannot control for the
number of transactions they make (which correspond well
to the degrees of nodes in the user graph) the power degree
law should be violated for this distribution when there are
thefts in the network.
The log-log plots of the average transaction size and bal-
ance are even a more obvious sign of the existence of ab-
normal activities in the network. There appear to be many
points in these plots which stay randomly and far away from
the main core lines. These plots do not look fit for any usual
kind of degree distribution and thus, the unusual points here
correspond to suspicious users in the network.
We now turn to the transaction graph. (Figure 4.)
Figure 4: The log-log Plot of Degree / Total Amount
Distributions - Transaction Graph.
For this graph type the in-degree and out-degree appear
quite alright, which makes sense with our straight line obser-
vation of the densification power law for transaction-as-node
graph. However, the plot for total amount (for each trans-
action) behaves abnormally. There is a significant portion
of points in the plot which stay far away from the core line;
these points correspond to the suspicious transactions in the
network.
By the power degree & densification laws, we conclude
that there are apparent anomalies in the network; in other
words, there exist users who conduct illegal activities. Next,
we will use k-means clustering method and local outlier fac-
tor method to figure out who those users might be.
5.2 k-means Clustering
Following Xiong et al. [?], to find the optimal value of
k we calculate the entropy measure and choose the integer
k corresponding to the smallest entropy. Being mindful of
computational time, we limit our selection of k to be between
2 and 10. We run the clustering algorithm and find that
for the user graph, at k = 7 we obtain the lowest entropy
measure between clusters, which indicates that k = 7 is
optimally selected for this graph type. (Figure 5.) For the
transaction graph, the optimal k is k = 8. However, for the
sake of the dual evaluation method, we will choose k = 7 for
both graph types.
Now we plot these k = 7 clusters for each graph type.
(Figures 6− 7.)
Visualizing all points and their respective cluster assign-
ments, we see that one cluster comprises the vast majority of
the data points. The remaining six clusters are composed of
Figure 5: Cross-cluster entropy versus k.
Figure 6: k-means clustering of Average Inbound
Value versus In - Degree. (User Graph)
users who are further away from this major cluster, but still
comprise significantly large and significantly homogeneous
groups in order to be clustered. Figures 6 and 7 are plots
in two dimensions of the clusters found by our algorithm for
two graph types. Figure 6 is the plot for the user graph in
two dimensions of in-degree and inbound value while Figure
7 is the plot for the transaction graph with two dimensions
being out-degree and total value. We can certainly plot over
all pairs of features we use in k-means method, but for visu-
alizing purpose we believe that these two plots are sufficient.
In Table 1, we report the list of cluster centroids (for
k = 7) for the user graph. (The corresponding table for
the transaction graph is not quite illustrative so we will not
present it here.) We find that all cluster centroids have rel-
atively low cluster coefficients, implying that few users have
high cluster coefficients, and the ones who do are not rela-
tively similar to others. Other measures like in-degree, out-
degree, mean in value, mean out value vary in values across
the centroids. Hence, these measures not good indicators to
tell whether some users are likely to be anomalies or not.
In the next part, we report the results obtained from the
local outlier factor method.
5.3 Local Outlier Factor
Figure 7: k-means clustering of Total Value versus
Out - Degree. (Transaction Graph)
In
Deg
Out
Deg
Mean
In Val
Mean
Out Val
Cluster
Coeff.
110.83 22.28 18.12 20.87 0.09
10.48 2.36 28.86 47.77 0.07
16.38 3.33 32.18 42.80 0.09
54.52 10.44 26.72 27.20 0.07
16.67 4.45 31.93 33.72 0.06
5.66 5.88 184.70 184.45 0.03
31.33 6.52 34.20 35.44 0.06
Table 1: List of cluster centroids for k = 7. (User
Graph)
In Tables 2 and 3, we report a list of top nine outliers for
the user and transaction graphs (i.e. anomalies) with k = 7.
In each table, we rank the detected outliers (anomalies) in
the reversed order of the LOF indices, starting with the
highest value. The relative distance column gives the LOF
indices relative to the maximum value of the LOF index for
each graph type.
First, we consider the user graph. Looking at these out-
liers, one pattern we identify is that outliers all have a clus-
tering coefficient of one. This could occur due to the scarcity
of users who have such a high clustering coefficient, and so
there is no centroid that has a higher clustering coefficient.
The in-degree and out-degree measures vary in values, so
they do not tell the story of anomalies. However, the mean-
in-value and mean-out-value are quite interesting as it ap-
pears that the detected outliers have really similar values
for these two measures. (50 for mean-in-value and 100 for
mean-out-value.)
Now, we consider the transaction graph. There are no
obvious patterns for the detected outliers (i.e. suspicious
transactions). We use three features for the transaction
graph including in-degree, out-degree, and total amount of
transaction; it appears that all these three measures vary
in values. So similarly to the user graph, the in-degree and
out-degree measures do not tell the story of anomalies. But
differently from the user graph, in this case the total amount
(value) measure is also not indicative of whether a node is
abnormal.
We proceed by plotting the detected outliers using the
LOF method together with k-means clusters for the two
graph types. (Figures 8− 9.)
Relative
Distance
In
Deg
Out
Deg
Mean
In Val
Mean
Out Val
Cluster
Coeff.
1.00 3 3 47.6 81 1
0.90 1 3 50 100 1
0.20 4 4 47.5 85 1
0.15 1 3 50 100 1
0.14 3 5 50 100 1
0.13 2 4 50 100 1
0.13 1 3 50 100 1
0.12 40 40 50 98 1
0.12 1 3 50 100 1
Table 2: List of top outliers for k = 7 (User Graph).
Relative
Distance
In
Deg
Out
Deg
Value
1.00 21 2 147.6
0.98 20 3 102.1
0.97 14 4 47.5
0.77 12 2 50
0.71 2 6 78.5
0.65 9 2 89.3
0.59 14 3 50
0.57 40 40 89.5
0.56 1 8 77
Table 3: List of top outliers for k = 7 (Transaction
Graph).
Figure 8 is the plot for the user graph on two dimen-
sions of the in-degree and average in-value. We observe that
detected outliers (suspicious users) lie at the border sur-
rounding the normal nodes. The nodes with extremely high
value of the average in-value measure appear highly likely to
be anomalies. The same conclusion is drawn for node with
extremely low value of the in-degree measure. Some other
detected outliers have values of these measures in between,
though other measures should be really extreme instead.
Figure 9 is the plot for the transaction graph on two di-
mensions of the out-degree and total value. Similarly to
the user graph, we observe that detected outliers (suspi-
cious transactions) lie at the border of the plot. The nodes
with extremely low and high value of the out-degree measure
appear highly likely to be anomalies. Likewise, nodes with
extremely high value of the total value (for each transaction)
are likely to be detected as anomalies.
Recall that in the result section of Power law Degree dis-
tribution & Densification power law, any measures related
to money (balance, transaction size, total amount or value,
etc.) behave abnormally with many extreme points staying
out of the core shape of the plots. That observation is con-
sistent with the detected outliers we get through the LOF
method here in the sense that points with extreme values
are likely to be anomalies.
6. EVALUATION OF RESULTS
We follow the three proposed evaluation methods to eval-
uate our findings.
• Using k-means clustering method, we get k clusters
with corresponding k centroids. For each graph type
(for the LOF method), we calculate the average of the
Figure 8: k-means clustering of In - Degree versus
Average In-Value. User outliers are represented by
larger circles.
Figure 9: k-means clustering of Total Value versus
Out - Degree. Transaction outliers are represented
by larger circles
ratios of detected anomaly distances to corresponding
centroids over max distances from those centroids to
their assigned points for the top 100 outliers.
For the LOF method, we get 0.965 for the user graph
and 0.914 for the transaction graph. These values are
as large as we expect them to be since by observations
in the Results section, detected anomalies appear to
be extreme points.
• To evaluate the agreement between the two graph types,
we compute A1 = 0.72 and A2 = 0.37, resulting in
mDE = 0.55. The value of mDE is quite high, indicat-
ing that the LOF method is consistent.
• Using the LOF method, we detect one known theft via
a Trojan keylogger that occurred in 2012. The anoma-
lous transaction was one in a series of transactions that
obtained a total of 2, 600 Bitcoins from 22 various ad-
dresses and funneled them to a single address.
7. FUTURE STUDIES
The biggest challenge for problems with unlabelled data
is testing. There is no obvious, universally agreed way to
do testing for any kind of algorithms for such problems. In
this project, besides using the publicly revealed thefts we
propose two metrics with the hope to evaluate our method-
ology. Though with these evaluation methods we can some-
what evaluate the consistency of our (LOF) anomaly detec-
tion method, in no way we can evaluate its accuracy.
In the future, we would like to go deeper into this issue.
Specifically, we will find better evaluation methods. One
direction is to generate similar data but with labels, and we
test our methods on the newly generated data and finding
results for the original data.
Once better evaluation methods are proposed, we would
also like to investigate better approaches to solving the anomaly
detection problem. The LOF method is nice, but it is by no
means the universally best one. In fact, literature has ob-
served several modifications of this method as well as totally
new ones in this area. We would like to look into the meth-
ods that can deal efficiently with network type data.
Regarding the Bitcoin network, we can also improve on
getting better features out of the data. One possible way
is to segment transaction network into time slices. We can
also detect smaller communities within the Bitcoin network
and work explicitly within each community.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate the Bitcoin network. We first
represent the data with two focuses: users and transactions.
We then use three main social network techniques to detect
anomalies, which are potential anomalous users and trans-
actions. While the agreement metrics are not high, we are
able to detect one known case of theft, out of the 30 known
cases we have. Since these techniques apply in other network
settings, we in fact worked on a bigger problem of anomaly
detection in networks.
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